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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROSS WANGSGARD, 
Plaintiff-A ppellant, 
vs. 
PEGGY FITZPATRICK, WILLIAM 
LENCE, THOMAS R. MATHEWS, 
and BONNIE J. MATHEWS, 
his wife, 
Defendants-Respondents 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action to recover damages which the 
plaintiff alleges he sustained when the defendants 
forcibly entered certain real property located at 368 
South Main Street, Park City, Utah. Plaintiff further 
alleges the defendants wrongfully evicted him from 
the said premises by ousting he and one Marvin Ryan 
to whom the plaintiff had subleased a portion of the 
premises; and by changing the locks on the door of 
the premises. [See complaint R. 105-109]. 
Case 
No. 
13890 
1 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This matter was originally set for Jury trial on 
October 9, 1974. [R. 1181. After all of the parties, 
counsel and the jury had appeared, counsel for the 
defendants made a motion to dismiss the complaint 
on the grounds it failed to state a cause of action in 
that the plaintiff had no standing under the laws of 
Utah to bring the action. [R. 119]. Both parties made 
a substantial oral argument at that time [R. 119-127]; 
after which the court took the matter under advise-
ment, dismissed the jury, and asked both counsel to 
file simultaneous briefs dealing with their respective 
positions. [R. 127-129]. Thereafter, the defendants 
filed their Memorandum In Support of Their Motion 
To Dismiss [R. 2-7]; and the plaintiff filed his Memor-
andum In Opposition To the Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss. [R. 110-117]. After reviewing these written 
memorandam, the court denied the defendants' 
motion to dismiss. [R. 74-a, 74-bL 
The case was then reset for jury trial to com-
mence November 6, 1974 [R. 73, 130]; whereupon 
a two-day jury trial was held November 6, and 7, 
1974. [R. 130-326]. During this time, the defendants 
again renewed their motion to dismiss which was 
taken under advisement. [R. 215]. The court sub-
sequently granted a motion for Summary Judgment 
after both sides rested. [R. 329-336]. This judgment 
was signed on November 12, 1974. [R. 14-15]. The 
plaintiff thereafter filed his notice of appeal on 
November 15, 1974. [R. 13]. 
2 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks the following relief: (1) to 
reverse the decision of the Honorable Marcellus K. 
Snow in granting the respondents' motion for sum-
mary judgment, (2) to find and so order that all 
respondents were guilty of both a forcible entry and 
wrongful eviction of the appellant Ross Wangsgard, 
(3) to remand this case for a new trial on the issue 
of damages only, and (4) in the event this court 
remands the entire case for a new trial on all issues 
then the appellant also requests a ruling from this 
court as to the admissibility of certain real property 
leasehold agreements and as to testimony from the 
landlord. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In March, 1971, the plaintiff and one Gene May-
field entered into a joint venture to operate a bar 
business known as the BLACKOUT located at 368 
South Main Street, Park City, Utah. [R. 134]. Mr. 
Mayfield had previously lived in California, had 
moved to Utah, and was interested in finding employ-
ment. [R. 134]. He contacted the plaintiff about con-
ducting the BLACKOUT business in Park City. The 
plaintiff agreed to advance the necessary finances for 
their initial investment; and Mr. Mayfield agreed 
to conduct the actual operation of the business. [R. 
134]. Prior to this time, the BLACKOUT business 
was being run by one E. B. Cooksey and/or his 
3 
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corporation known as The Silver Park Limited. [Ex. 
12-P, R. 174]. 
On March 17, 1971, the plaintiff and Gene May-
field entered into an Earnest Money Receipt and 
Offer To Purchase the said BLACKOUT business from 
Mr. Cooksey. [Ex. 12-PL The sale was handled by 
Imperial Realty Company. [Ex. 12-P, R. 174]. The 
sale was consummated on March 26, 1971, when the 
said plaintiff and Mayfield paid $9,650.00 for the 
purchase of the business. [Ex. 13-P, R. 174]. Approx-
imately $2,000 was paid down and a balance of 
$7,650 was financed in a Title Retaining Promissory 
Note bearing date of March 25, 1971, and calling 
for monthly payments of $250.70. [Ex. 8-P, R. 134]. 
Concurrent with the purchase of the business 
from Mr. Cooksey, the plaintiff and Mayfield also 
entered into an ASSIGNMENT OF LEASE whereby 
Mr. Cooksey assigned all of the interest he had in 
and to the real property at 368 South Main Street, 
Park City, Utah, to Gene Mayfield and Ross Wangs-
gard. [Ex. 7-P, R. 133-135]. This ASSIGNMENT 
OF LEASE was executed by the plaintiff, Mayfield, 
Cooksey, and three other men who were the land-
lords and who owned the premises: Robert E. 
McConaughy III, Walker M. Wallace, and John M. 
Wallace. [Ex. 7-P, R. 2 ] . 
This ASSIGNMENT OF LEASE referred to cer-
tain underlying documents, to-wit: REAL PROPERTY 
LEASE [Ex. 5-P] and AMENDMENT OF REAL 
4 
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PROPERTY LEASE [Ex. 6-PL The defendants ob-
jected to Exhibits 5-P, 6-P and 7-P being received in 
evidence: and the court took the objection under 
advisement. [R. 133-139]. The plaintiff sought re-
peatedly to introduce testimony as to the plaintiff's 
status under the leases; but each time the court took 
the matter under advisement or sustained objections 
to the testimony. [R. 133-139, 179, 308-312]. Finally 
and after extensive further oral argument by counsel, 
[R. 204-220], the trial judge sustained the defendant's 
objections to Exhibits 5-P, 6-P, and 7-P. [R. 221]. 
Thereafter, the plaintiff made an offer of proof 
pursuant to Rule 43(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure as to the admissability of Exhibits 5-P, 6-P 
and 7-P. [R. 223]. Because of this offer of proof, the 
plaintiff is referring to these exhibits and the testi-
mony concerning these exhibits in this brief. 
After the lease agreements were executed, the 
plaintiff and Gene Mayfield entered onto the premises 
at 368 South Main Street, Park City, Utah, and began 
to operate the BLACKOUT business. [R. 140]. 
Approximately one to three months after they entered 
onto the premises, the plaintiff purchased some pool 
tables, juke boxes, pinball machines, and cigarette 
machines at a cost of approximately $5,000 and put 
these on the premises. [R. 141, 252]. These items are 
referred to in the testimony as recreational or amuse-
ment items as opposed to the bar equipment which 
was being purchased from Mr. Cooksey. 
Approximately one year after they commenced 
the business, Gene Mayfield had another business 
5 
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opportunity- and the plaintiff purchased all of May-
field's interest in the real property leases and the 
other items of personal property and trade equipment. 
[R. 141-142]. Mr. Mayfield executed a BILL OF 
SALE dated May 27, 1972, and an ASSIGNMENT 
OF INTEREST IN LEASE in connection with this 
transaction. [Ex. 11-P, 9-P, R. 141-142, 173]. There-
fore, after May of 1972, the plaintiff was the only 
person who had any interest in the real property lease 
or in the personal property or trade equipment on the 
premises at 368 South Main Street, Park City, Utah. 
The plaintiff made all of his rental payments to the 
landlords and operated the business himself personal-
ly through January, 1973. [R. 143]. During this 
period of time, the plaintiff realized an annual profit 
of $5,000 from the bar business and an additional 
$5,000 from the recreational or amusement items. 
[R. 144]. 
During the latter part of 1972, the plaintiff 
decided to sell the BLACKOUT business and to retain 
only his interest in the recreational items. [R. 145]. 
This decision was based on several factors: the plain-
tiff had met his present wife about this time and 
planned a marriage for April, 1973. This prompted 
a desire to spend more time with his family of four 
teenage sons. He also had four eye operations that 
were needed in the coming year. Finally, he had 
experienced some problems with employees and some 
unexplained disappearances of money. Based upon all 
these factors, he decided to sell the BLACKOUT 
business. [R. 145,235]. 
6 
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He listed the business with Imperial Realty Com-
pany at a price of $10,000. [Ex. 8-P, R. 1461. He 
did not include the amusement or recreational items 
in the sale because he was making a good profit on 
them for the investment he incurred. [R. 146]. More-
over, since he was willing to sell the bar business on 
a contract, he felt he should make frequent trips to 
Park City, to insure his investment in the bar equip-
ment was not being wasted. [R. 1461. So, since he 
was going there anyway to protect his investment, it 
was a simple matter for him to maintain his amuse-
ment or recreational machines. [R. 146]. 
One Marvin Ryan had been plaintiffs manager 
in the operation of the BLACKOUT business. During 
January, 1973, Mr. Ryan and the plaintiff agreed 
to a purchase and sale of the business at a price of 
$10,000.00. [R. 147-148]. As stated, the sale did not 
include the recreational or amusement items. Mr. 
Ryan was to pay the $10,000 for the business at the 
rate of $300 per month. In addition, he was to pay 
all utilities and to pay the monthly rental due under 
the lease agreements. [R. 181 ] . Mr. Ryan was to take 
possession of the property on February 1, 1973. [R. 
177]. The plaintiff retained the title to all of the bar 
equipment until the full purchase price was paid 
because no down payment was made. [R. 177-178]. 
The plaintiff testified Mr. Ryan was going to operate 
the business for two to six months; and if Ryan could 
get in a profitable financial condition, there would be 
a formal written contract pertaining to the $10,000.00 
purchase price. [R. 178]. The contract was never 
7 
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formalized; and Mr. Ryan died in approximately 
November, 1973. [R. 178]. The defendant William 
Lence testified that Ryan told him there was no 
intent on Ryan's part to purchase the items because 
Ryan felt the price was too high and the tourist season 
was about over. [R. 275]. 
The landlord sold the premises at 368 South 
Main Street, Park City, Utah, to the defendants 
Mathews on March 28, 1973. [Ex. 4-D, R. 311]. The 
sale was on a Uniform Real Estate Contract in which 
the seller retained title until the full purchase price 
was paid. [See paragraph 18 of Ex. 4-D]. The pur-
chase price was $50,000 payable $10,000 down and 
the balance of $40,000 at the rate of $250.00 per 
month. The said principal amount drew interest at 
the rate of eight percent (8%) per annum. The 
plaintiff did not receive any official notice from either 
the sellers or the purchasers of the sale. [R. 192-193]. 
And even though he had heard rumors about a sale, 
Mr. Robert Cole, selling agent for Imperial Realty 
Company with whom he had listed the BLACKOUT 
business, assured him that the landlords through Mr. 
McConaughy said there would be no problem renew-
ing the lease agreements. [R. 192-193, 239-241]. 
The first notice of any kind the plaintiff received 
concerning the sale of the real property at 368 South 
Main Street, Park City, Utah [R. 192-193], or con-
cerning the desire of the new owner to have the plain-
tiff remove his property [R. 249] was in the form of 
a telephone call from the defendant, Peggy Fitz-
8 
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patrick, sometime during the early part of April, 
1973, probably the second week. [R. 243]. Mrs. Fitz-
patrick called the plaintiff's laundromat business in 
Granger, Utah, and left word with plaintiff's son that 
she wanted to talk to the plaintiff. [R. 183]. When 
the plaintiff returned the call, Mrs. Fitzpatrick told 
him that she represented purchasers of the property 
in Park City and asked him if he was aware the bar 
business had been closed during the weekend. [R. 
183]. The plaintiff said he didn't know the property 
had been sold, nor that it had been closed. [R. 183, 
242-243]. He said he had been there two or three 
days prior to the weekend, and the business had been 
fully operating at that time. [R. 183]. 
Mrs. Fitzpatrick also told the plaintiff at this 
time that she wanted him to get his equipment out of 
the premises. [R. 183]. When the plaintiff tried to 
find out who the new purchasers of the premises were, 
Fitzpatrick told him that it was none of his business, 
that Mrs. Fitzpatrick was representing them and they 
expected him to remove his property. [R. 242-247]. 
In later telephone conversations, he attempted to find 
out who the new landlords were and talk to them 
about a renewal of the lease; but Mrs. Fitzpatrick 
continued to tell them that the landlords were not 
available to talk to him, there was no need for 
conversation and he was to move his equipment out 
immediately. [R. 242-247]. During this first tele-
phone conversation, the plaintiff told Mrs. Fitzpatrick 
that he would get back in touch with her. He then 
got in his van and drove immediately to Park City. 
9 
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[R. 183]. He found the bar was open, the bar was 
running with business as usual, customers were in 
the place and there was no appearance of any damage 
to the premises. [R. 183]. 
The plaintiff testified he talked to Marvin Ryan 
and asked Ryan if anybody had told him about clos-
ing up the business or about a sale of the property. 
He said Ryan replied he was not aware of any sale 
or that the business was supposed to be closed. [R. 
189]. Plaintiff told Ryan about the telephone call and 
stated to him emphatically plaintiff considered he 
was a legal tenant and he had a right to keep the 
business operating until the new landlords took what-
ever action was necessary to get the business stopped. 
[R. 189]. 
The plaintiff testified he called the defendant 
Fitzpatrick back the next day and told her the 
business was not closed and asked her why she was 
calling him about getting his equipment out of the 
premises. According to the plaintiff's testimony, Fitz-
patrick said, "You are the tenant of record that was 
on the lease there," and that she was calling him as 
a representative of the new owners. [R. 190]. Fitz-
patrick stated again the reason she called him was 
because he was a tenant of record on the lease. 
[R. 192, 194]. The plaintiff testified he told Fitz-
patrick he was indeed the tenant of the property, he 
did not wish to move- that he had been assured the 
lease would be renewed and he was going to continue 
his business at this location. [R. 194]. Fitzpatrick 
10 
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again emphasized that the plaintiff would have to get 
out of the premises. [R. 194]. 
Plaintiff said he then went back to Park City and 
talked to Ryan again and told him to stay on the 
premises and not to stop the business. [R. 194]. The 
plaintiff testified R3^an told him all of the rent pay-
ments had been made for February, March and April, 
1973. [R. 194]. The plaintiff himself had made all 
the rental payments due to the landlord through the 
date of the sale to Ryan on February 1, 1973, and also 
had made all of the payments on the bar equipment 
through January, 1973. [R. 177]. 
The plaintiff testified Peggy Fitzpatrick called 
him again about two days later and asked him when 
he was going to move his equipment out of Park City. 
Fie told her he had a going business and would like 
to meet with the new owners to negotiate a new lease 
on the premises and continue in the building. [R. 
195]. He was refused this right. [R. 242-247]. Plain-
tiff testified he went back to Park City the following 
Sunday and the bar was being closed, there was no 
business going on and Mr. Ryan was removing his 
personal effects. [R. 195-196]. 
When he asked Ryan why he was closing the 
business, Ryan told him the defendant William Lence 
who was the Justice of the Peace in Park City told 
him to get out of the building. Ryan said Lence stated 
unless Ryan vacated the building by that Sunday 
evening, Lence was going to proceed with action 
11 
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against him. Ryan said that since he lived in Park 
City and Lence was the Justice of the Peace, he had 
no choice but to close the business. [R. 196]. 
Plaintiff testified since the bar was closed, the 
only thing he could do was to try and salvage what 
was left; but he could not remove his equipment 
immediately because of physical problems with his 
eyes which made it difficult to see very well at night. 
[R. 196J. 
The plaintiff testified the next call he received 
was from Peggy Fitzpatrick who told him the locks 
had been changed on the building and he would be 
allowed to remove his equipment by obtaining keys 
which she would leave in businesses near the BLACK-
OUT. She said the new owners had a contractor 
coming to remodel the building; they had another 
tenant they wanted to get in the building; and they 
wanted the plaintiffs equipment out. [R. 198]. The 
plaintiff had not received any legal notice from either 
the defendants or from the landlords to vacate the 
building and no lawsuit had been commenced to have 
him vacate the building at the time Mrs. Fitzpatrick 
called him, nor after that time. [R. 192-193, 249]. 
Peggy Fitzpatrick refused to allow the plaintiff to 
remove the back bar or front bar [R. 197-198] as did 
Mr. Lence. [R. 257]. 
The plaintiff testified that he sent his sixteen and 
eighteen year old boys with a U-haul type truck to 
Park City to remove some of the equipment. He said 
12 
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the boys removed the equipment over a three to four 
day period, but defendant Lence told them they could 
not take the back bar nor the front bar. [R. 197-198]. 
The plaintiff testified that Ryan told him none of the 
defendants had given Ryan any notice to close the 
bar other than when the Justice of the Peace, William 
Lence, told Ryan to get out. [R. 249]. Plaintiff said 
when his equipment was moved from the premises, 
he did not detect any vandalism damage or excessive 
water problems in the premises. 
The plaintiff's son, Ric Wangsgard, stated he and 
his brother rented an Easy Haul Truck, an eighteen 
foot van, and went to Park City to remove the equip-
ment. He said the defendant William Lence drove up 
in his Jeep Wagoneer; and he was definitely mad. 
He said Mr. Lence had his fists clenched and he was 
growling and talking through his teeth. He said that 
Lence came up to him with kind of a half smile and 
said, " CI bet your dad is pretty pissed off about me 
kicking him out of here, or locking him out,' and 
then he strolled around a while longer and told me 
the back bar wasn't to be removed." [R. 257]. Ross 
Wangsgard testified he removed his equipment from 
the premises after the locks were changed but not 
before. [R. 322T7 
The plaintiff testified he tried to sell his equip-
ment over about the next year and one half; and he 
received approximately $1,900.00 for the bar equip-
ment which he had purchased for $9,650.00 and the 
recreational items which he had brought onto the 
13 
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property at a cost of $5,000.00. [R. 199-200]. He 
stated he lost approximately $200 per month profit 
on the recreational items that he had in the business 
and prior to the time he sold the bar equipment to 
Marvin Ryan he was making a profit of $400 per 
month. [R. 202]. He further testified as to the mental 
anguish and embarrassment he had experienced be-
cause of the forcible entry and wrongful eviction from 
the premises. [R. 228]. He stated even after he 
removed his equipment, he attempted to work this 
matter out with Mrs. Fitzpatrick for an additional 
two or three week period of time, but was unable to 
do so. [R. 299-230]. Thereafter, he commenced his 
lawsuit on June 29, 1973—about one and one-half 
months after he removed his equipment from the 
business. [R. 229-230]. 
The defendant William Lence testified that Ryan 
closed the business on Sunday, April 15, 1973, and 
early Monday morning, April 16, 1973. [R. 278]. 
He testified that the locks were changed about April 
26 or 27th or about ten days after Ryan left the bus-
iness. [R. 280]. During this ten day period all of 
the property in the premises at 368 South Main 
Street, Park City, Utah, belonged to the plaintiff. 
When Ryan left, he abandoned any interest he had 
in the property he was purchasing from the plaintiff. 
Lence said he had talked to Mathews about changing 
the locks but it was really instructions from Peggy 
Fitzpatrick that actually made him do it. [R. 280]. 
He stated he was an employee of the defendants 
Mathews. [R. 282]. On cross-examination by his own 
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attorney, Mr. Lence stated Peggy Fitzpatrick told 
him Ross Wangsgard owned the equipment in the 
building such as table and chairs and few things like 
that. [R. 282]. He said he (Lence) knew Wangsgard 
owned the property when he talked to Marvin Ryan. 
[R. 277]. The defendant Lence further testified 
Marvin Ryan told him Ryan was renting the prem-
ises from Ross Wangsgard. [R. 275]. Lence further 
testified Ryan told him he was paying $100 per 
month rent to the plaintiff Ross Wangsgard and Ryan 
never mentioned he was paying rent to anyone else. 
[R. 276]. 
I 
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN GRANTING 
THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT THEREBY TAKING THE CASE FROM 
THE JURY BECAUSE THERE WERE DISPUTED 
ISSUES OF FACT REGARDING THE PLAINTIFF'S 
LEASEHOLD INTEREST AND STATUS AT THE 
TIME OF THE DEFENDANTS' FORCIBLE ENTRY 
AND WRONGFUL EVICTION OF PLAINTIFF. 
1. What causes of action are involved in the 
instant lawsuit? The complaint raises two issues or 
causes of action, to-wit: (1) wrongful eviction and 
(2) forcible entry. The pleadings are sufficient to es-
tablish both causes of action; even though each is not 
separately pleaded in separate counts. [Alice Ellefsen 
v William Dibblee Roberts, U. 2d , 526 P. 2d 
912 (1974).] Both of these issues were argued by the 
parties at the defendants' motion to dismiss at the 
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commencement of the first trial on Wednesday, Oc-
tober 9, 1974, [See plaintiff's "Trial Memorandum In 
Opposition To Defendants' Motion to Dismiss" (R. 
110-11) and especially paragraph two at R. 114, et 
sequel; and defendants' "Memorandum of Points and 
Authority In Support of Defendants' Motion to Dis-
miss. (R. 2-7) ] . Both of these issues were also raised 
at the defendants' motion to dismiss held just before 
noon on the second day of trial, November 7th. [R. 
216]. And both of these issues were raised by the 
defendants in their final motion for summary judg-
ment held on the third day of the trial, [R. 329-331 ] ; 
at which time defendants' counsel refers to the forc-
ible entry cause of action as the "statutory" cause of 
action and the wrongful eviction cause of action as 
the "common law" cause of action. It is clear the 
trial judge was considering both of these causes of 
action at the time the motion for summary judgment 
was made and in fact his written summary judgment 
is granted as to both causes of action. [R. 14-15]. Both 
of these issues were the subject matter of the plain-
tiff's requested instructions [R. 36-66] and both will 
be considered in this brief. 
2. What was the basis for the trial judge's order 
granting the defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment? Commencing at line 7 on page 335 of the 
record, the trial judge discusses his feelings regarding 
the defendants' motion for summary judgment and 
the reasons why he thinks the motion should be 
granted. The court states in part as follows: 
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". . . the Court feels . . . these jurors could 
not disagree as to the status of the plaintiff at 
the time the overt acts took place on the part 
of the defendants, which is claimed amounted 
or could have amounted to a lockout or evic-
tion, because of the fact at that point the court 
finds [plaintiff] had no status or proprietory 
interest in the premises which would give rise 
in him to a cause of action for damages against 
these defendants. So the court will dismiss 
the matter." [R. 335-3361. [Emphasis added.] 
"However, the court does find that the 
plaintiff owns the back bar and the front bar, 
and as testified to this morning, it was 30 lineal 
feet on the front bar and I think 33 on the back 
bar, and so that will be timesed by the cost due 
for lineal foot, as testified to yesterday by the 
expert, and then that will be reduced by 50%, 
whatever that turns out to be. That will be the 
amount that will either be paid to Mr. Wangs-
gard by the defendants or if he chooses, he 
could have the front and back bars actually in 
lieu thereof if they are in fact available and 
can be separated from the real property with-
out damaging the real property or the back 
bar." [R. 3361. [Emphasis added.] 
From the foregoing citation, it appears clear the 
trial judge felt the plaintiff Ross Wangsgard did not 
have any leasehold interest or status in the real 
property at 368 South Main Street, Park City, Utah, 
at the time the defendants forcibly entered onto the 
premises and changed the locks on the door; nor at 
the time some two weeks earlier when the local 
Justice of the Peace of Park City entered into the 
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BLACKOUT business and told Marvin Ryan he would 
have to close the business and get his belongings out 
of the premises by the coming Sunday evening. This 
conduct as well as the threatening telephone calls and 
demanding messages from Peggy Fitzpatrick to the 
plaintiff Ross Wangsgard were clearly willful, 
wanton and malicious and were done without any 
written notice to vacate the premises and/or any 
legal action being commenced against either Ross 
Wangsgard or Marvin Ryan in unlawful detainer or 
otherwise. Consequently, the trial judge would be in 
error if the plaintiff did in fact have some leasehold 
or proprietory interest in the premises superior to the 
interest of the defendants. 
The action of the trial judge in granting the 
defendants' motion to dismiss, is inconsistent with 
his prior ruling refusing to grant an identical motion 
to dismiss which the defendants made at the com-
mencement of the first trial in October [R. 74-a, 74-b, 
118-129]; and is further inconsistent with the refusal 
of the trial judge to grant the motion to dismiss made 
at approximately 11:30 a.m. on the second day of 
the trial November 7, 1974. [R. 205-215]. 
The plaintiff further submits the trial judge's 
summary judgment is inconsistent within itself, [R. 
14-15; 355-336], for the following reasons: In para-
graph one of the said summary judgment, [R. 14], 
the trial judge granted the defendants' motion for 
summary judgment as to both (1) forcible entry and 
(2) wrongful eviction. Yet in paragraph two of the 
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summary judgment [R. 15] the trial judge admitted 
the back bar and the front bar were the sole property 
of the plaintiff; and he was entitled to recover the 
said items or their reasonable value. By holding the 
plaintiff did have his equipment, to-wit: the back bar 
and the front bar on the premises at 368 South Main 
Street, Park City, Utah, it is inconsistent for the trial 
judge to also hold the plaintiff did not have any of his 
property on the premises and therefore did not have 
any leasehold or proprietory interest in the premises. 
This point becomes even more clear when we 
examine paragraph 17 of Exhibit 5-P which is the 
REAL PROPERTY LEASE. This paragraph provides 
as follows: 
"17. HOLD OVER: In the event Tenant 
shall remain in possession of the leased prem-
ises or any part thereof after the expiration of 
the term of this Lease without any written 
agreement therefore, such holding over shall 
constitute a tenancy from month-to-month at 
a monthly rental equivalent to the then reason-
able rental value of the leased premises but not 
less than $175.00 per month." [Emphasis 
added.] 
It is obvious the back bar and front bar must have 
constituted a possession by the plaintiff of "any part" 
of the leased premises. Accordingly, the plaintiff by 
virtue of paragraph 17 itself, would be entitled to a 
tenancy from month-to-month and would have had 
a proprietory or leasehold interest in the property 
at the time of the wrongful conduct by the defend-
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ants. This would be so even if all the other property 
on the premises belonged to someone else; which 
point the plaintiff does not concede; since he had not 
only the front bar and the back bar on the premises 
but also his recreational and amusement machines; 
and the bar equipment he was selling to Marvin 
Ryan and which Ryan abandoned when the Justice of 
the Peace ordered him out. 
The trial judge himself appears to have some 
reservation about his summary judgment. In addi-
tion to having denied the same motion two times 
previous, the trial judge recommended an appeal be 
taken in this matter in the following language: 
"And I may be wrong here. And, Mr. 
Mcintosh, be sure that this Court is desirous 
of your appealing this thing, so if I am mis-
taken here or if I have done something pre-
maturally or not completely, I want to be told 
by the Supreme Court, and, so don't in any 
way think that this court feels, is going to feel 
offended, whatever, about an appeal, because 
I expect it and I want it" [R. 337, lines 20-26 ] . 
[Emphasis added.] 
The plaintiff would have appealed the case even with-
out this encouragement from the trial judge; but the 
language used by the trial judge shows he had some 
doubts about the correctness of his ruling. Such 
doubts on a motion for summary judgment should be 
enough by themselves to indicate to the trial judge 
there were legitimate disputed issues of fact to be 
tried by the jury; and this case was not all that clear 
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so reasonable minds could not differ. It appears the 
trial judge was disposed to grant the plaintiff's pro-
posed jury instructions on this issue and even marked 
them as "Given." [R. 41-461. Why he suddenly 
changed his mind on the case is a mystery to the 
plaintiff. 
It is interesting that the very point in issue upon 
which the judge decides this case, to-wit: the status of 
the plaintiff in the premises at the time the wrongful 
conduct of the defendants took place, was the very 
issue the trial judge denied the plaintiff the right to 
prove. That is, the plaintiff was prohibited from 
introducing testimony as to his status and his right to 
possession of the premises under either of the written 
lease agreements [Exs. 5-P, 6-P, and 7-P] or through 
the testimony of the landlord Robert McConaughy or 
through plaintiff's own testimony concerning the said 
lease documents. It is not clear why the judge refused 
to allow the lease documents into evidence nor to 
allow the testimony of the former landlords Robert 
McConaughy; but the plaintiff submits this Supreme 
Court should rule on this matter as a guide for the 
admissibility of this testimony in a second trial in 
the event this case is remanded for a new trial on all 
issues. 
3. What was the plaintiff Ross Wangs gardes 
interest in the premises at 368 South Main Street, 
Park City, Utah, at the time of defendants' wrongful 
conduct? The plaintiff's status as a tenant is reflected 
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in the Statement of Facts, supra. He had the follow-
ing leasehold, proprietory, and possessory interest. 
(1) Plaintiff was the tenant described in 
all the leasehold document—Exhibits 5-P, 6-P, and 
7-P; and the only person entitled to possession of the 
premises. Although Gene Mayfield was also named 
as a co-tenant in Ex. 7-P, he assigned all of his interest 
to the plaintiff in May 1972, [See Exs. 9-P, 11-P, 
R. 141-142, 173]. 
(2) The plaintiff had been assured by Im-
perial Realty's selling agent, Robert Cole, that the 
landlord Robert McConaughy would renew the lease 
agreements as soon as he returned from his trip out 
of state. [ R. 176, 239-241 ] . So even though the lease 
had expired, there was an affirmative statement by 
the landlord to renew. 
(3) The plaintiff was holding over as a 
tenant pursuant to paragraph 17 of the REAL 
PROPERTY LEASE. [Ex. 5-PL The initial lease 
terms was for a period of five years ending October 
31, 1972. All of the parties admit Ross Wangsgard 
was the only tenant in the premises during November 
and December, 1972, and January, 1973. 
(4) After February 1st, 1973, there were 
really two businesses being conducted on the leased 
premises—one by the plaintiff and one by Marvin 
Ryan. The plaintiff was holding over under para-
graph 17 of the REAL PROPERTY LEASE because 
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(1) he had $5,000 worth of recreational and amuse-
ment items of his own on the property which he was 
not selling to Marvin Ryan, (2) he retained title to 
the bar equipment worth $10,000 which he was sell-
ing to Marvin Ryan, (3) no other tenant was named 
on the Real Property documents, and (4) the land-
lord Robert McConaughy said he never did have any 
oral or written agreement with Marvin Ryan or any-
one else to lease the premises other than with Ross 
Wangsgard. The plaintiff's business with the recrea-
tional items was substantial and he testified in 1971 
and 1972 he had earned a profit of $5,000 from these 
items as well as $5,000 from the bar equipment sales. 
(5) Plaintiff did not assign his leasehold 
interest to Marvin Ryan because (1) the lease docu-
ments gave the plaintiff the first option to purchase 
the property which he considered a valuable property 
right, [Ex. 6-P, «J8, R. 193-194] (2) the sale of the 
business was tentative only and it would not be 
formalized in writing for two to six months and until 
Marvin Ryan could get in a sound financial position; 
therefore, the plaintiff wanted to wait and see how 
Ryan did. If he did poorly, and the plaintiff had to 
take back the business, he did not want to have to 
renegotiate his position on this lease, (3) plaintiff 
was liable anyway since there was no written agree-
ment with the landlord to assign the leasehold interest 
to Marvin Ryan, or to remove plaintiff from the 
leases as the party primarily responsible, (4) plaintiff 
had his own recreational and amusement items worth 
$5,000 on part of the leased premises which satisfied 
23 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
paragraph 17 of the Real Property Lease for a hold-
over status on the leased premises "or any part there-
of" and (5) he retained title to all of the other 
property on the premises which he was selling to 
Marvin Ryan. 
(6) The plaintiff visited the premises two 
to three times each week after February 1, 1973, until 
he was wrongfully evicted by the defendants in the 
latter part of April, 1973. These visits were to main-
tain his own recreational and amusement items as 
well as to check on the business that he was selling to 
Marvin Ryan to be sure that it was not being wasted. 
(7) Marvin Ryan defaulted in the month-
ly payments due on the bar equipment almost im-
mediately and only paid $300 during February, 
March, and April, whereas he should have paid $300 
per month. Therefore, he was in a default status 
and had no interest in the property. Under these cir-
cumstances, the plaintiff Ross Wangsgard would be 
the only title holder to the property and entitled to 
repossess it at any time. This ownership interest to-
gether with the fact he visited the business two to 
three times weekly, gives Ross Wangsgard a status of 
actually possessing the premises; even if he had not 
had his recreational amusement items on the 
premises. 
(8) Marvin Ryan left the BLACKOUT 
business on Sunday, April 15, 1973, when he was 
ordered out by the local Justice of the Peace, the 
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defendant — William Lence. At this time, he aban-
doned any and all interest he may have had in the 
bar equipment. Therefore, for the next ten days until 
the locks were changed on April 26 or 27th and there-
after, the only person who had any ownership rights 
to the property was the plaintiff Ross Wangsgard. 
(9) The defendants Peggy Fitzpatrick and 
William Lence both knew that Ross Wangsgard was 
the owner of the property and under the lease agree-
ment he was the recognized tenant. This is why 
they contacted him about removing the property. The 
contact by Peggy Fitzpatrick was before William 
Lence even contacted Marvin Ryan and before Ryan 
left the premises. 
(10) The plaintiff was in the premises 
through the subtenant Marvin Ryan who stated to 
the defendant William Lence, he, Ryan, was renting 
the premises from Ross Wangsgard. [R. 275]. 
It appears clear the plaintiff had a substantial 
leasehold, proprietory, possessory interest in the real 
property at 368 South Main Street, Park City, Utah, 
at the time of the defendants' wrongful conduct. He 
was the responsible party on all the real property 
agreements Exs. 5-P, 6-P, 7-P, and was holding over 
pursuant to paragraph 17 of Exhibit 5-P. The land-
lords acknowledged the status of Wangsgard as the 
tenant they dealt with prior to the sale to defendants 
Mathews; and they stated they never did have any 
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dealing with Ryan or any oral or written agreement 
with Ryan to lease the premises. 
4. What was Marvin Ryan's interest in the real 
property at 368 South Main Street, Park City, Utah, at 
the time of the defendants' wrongful conduct? Since 
Marvin Ryan died in November, 1973, [R. 178] he 
did not testify at the trial. However, his status on 
the premises is found in the testimony of the plain-
tiff Ross Wangsgard and the defendant William 
Lence. Counsel for defendants waived the hearsay 
objections to conversations with Ryan. [R. 186-187]. 
The plaintiff testified Marvin Ryan had worked 
for him and operated the bar for him during Decem-
ber, 1972, and January, 1973. [R. 147-148]. In Janu-
ary, 1973, Mr. Ryan and the plaintiff agreed to the 
purchase and sale of the business at a price of $10,000. 
[R. 147-148]. The sale didn't include the recreational 
or amusement items for which the plaintiff had paid 
$5,000 and which he owned in his own name. [R. 
146]. Mr. Ryan was to pay the $10,000 for the busi-
ness at the rate of $300 per month. In addition he 
was to pay all utilities and to pay the monthly rental 
due under the lease agreements. [R. 181]. Mr. Ryan 
was to take possession of the property on February 1, 
1973. [R. 177]. The plaintiff did not assign his lease-
hold interest to Ryan; [R. 180]; although he did in 
fact sublease a portion of the premises to Ryan; at 
the same time he sold the bar equipment. 
Since Ryan didn't pay anything down, the plain-
tiff retained the title to all the bar equipment until 
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the full purchase price was paid. [R. 177, 1781. The 
plaintiff testified Mr. Ryan was going to operate the 
business for two to six months; and if Ryan could 
get in a profitable financial condition, there would be 
a formal written contract pertaining to the $10,000 
purchase price. [R. 1781. The contract was never 
formalized and Ryan died in November, 1973. [R. 
1781. Although Ryan should have paid to the plain-
tiff a total of $900 during February, March and April, 
1973; in actuality, he only paid to the plaintiff $300 
which consisted of $100 on one occasion and $200 
on another occasion. [R. 234-235]. 
The defendant William Lence testified Ryan told 
him he was renting the premises from Ross Wangs-
gard. [R. 275 ]. Ryan also told Lence Ross Wangsgard 
owned the equipment in the building such as a table, 
chairs, and a few similar items; and this knowledge 
had been conveyed to him, Lence, by Peggy Fitz-
patrick, as well as by Ryan himself. [R. 277, 282]. 
He testified Ryan closed the business on Sunday, April 
15th and early Monday morning, April 16, 1973. 
[R. 278]. He testified the locks were changed about 
April 26 or 27th or about ten days after Ryan left the 
business. [R. 280]. During this ten day period, all of 
the property in the premises at 368 South Main 
Street, Park City, Utah, belonged to the plaintiff. 
When Ryan left the premises, it is obvious he aban-
doned any interest he had in the property he was 
purchasing from the plaintiff. 
Since the plaintiff had never relinquished his 
status as a tenant under the real property leases, and 
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since the landlord had no oral agreement or written 
agreement to lease the premises to Marvin Ryan, it 
is clear the plaintiff is the only one who had any 
interest in the leasehold agreements and was the 
tenant who was holding over after the expiration of 
the lease pursuant to paragraph 17 of the REAL 
PROPERTY LEASE. [Ex. 5-P]. When Marvin Ryan 
told William Lence he, Ryan, was leasing the property 
from Ross Wangsgard, it is clear Ryan understood he 
was at most a subtenant de facto; even though the 
official written consent of the landlord to said sub-
tenancy had not yet been obtained. It further appears 
clear the subtenancy from the plaintiff to Ryan was 
for less than the entire area the plaintiff was leasing. 
This is so because the plaintiff retained a portion of 
the premises for his $5,000 worth of recreational and 
amusement items. 
It is well settled that a tenant may sublet the 
premises in whole or in part; and a lessee need not be 
in possession of the demised premises, his right to sub-
let not being dependent upon his possession. Thus a 
lessee may, before entry, make a good sublease. The 
only limitation on the right of a lessee to sublet the 
premises is they cannot be sublet to be used in a 
manner inconsistent with the terms of the original 
lease or injurious to the premises. 49 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Landlord and Tenant, 470 §481 "Right to Sublet." 
A subletting creates a new estate dependent upon 
or carved out of but distinct from the original lease-
hold. When Ross Wangsgard rented a portion of the 
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leased premises to Ryan and retained a portion for 
Wangsgard's amusement items, Wangsgard in effect 
subblet a portion of the premises to Ryan. Imperial 
Realty and its agent Robert Cole had assured plaintiff 
the landlord would renew the lease with plaintiff 
upon the landlord's return from out of State. There-
fore there would be no violation of the lease provision 
affecting a sublease without the consent of the land-
lord; since this consent was given. Moreover, it has 
been held the courts do not favor such provisions 
against subletting since they are in restraint of 
alienation. Some courts hold where the lease restricts 
the use of the premises to a particular purpose and 
provides the lessee shall not sublet the premises for 
any other purpose, the lessee may sublet the premises 
to be used for the particular authorized purposes. 
49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant, 473, Part B, 
RESTRICTIONS AGAINST SUBLETTING, Section 
485 "Generally." It is clear Marvin Ryan was using 
the premises for the same purposes Wangsgard had 
used them. 
Other courts have held that permitting a third 
person to enter into the joint occupation of the prem-
ises with the lessee is not necessarily a subletting, and 
that the fact that a lessee conducting a business on 
the demised premises takes a third person into part-
nership with him and thus lets such third person into 
joint possession of the premises is not a breach of 
a covenant against subletting, 49 Am. Jur., 2d, Land-
lord and Tenant, 472 §484 "What Constitutes A Sub-
letting." Consequently, it appears clear, Marvin Ryan 
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was at most a subtenant of the lessee Wangsgard. 
Wangsgard still remained liable on the original lease 
agreements including the holding over provisions and 
the landlord would have looked to Wangsgard not 
Ryan for any breach of the lease. 
5. What was the defendants' interest in the real 
property at 368 South Main Street, Park City, Utah, 
at the time of their wrongful conduct? Counsel for 
the defendants on the last day of the trial stipulated 
and admitted each of the defendants would be bound 
by the conduct of any of them because they were 
in a common agency with each other. [R. 3261. 
The plaintiff submits none of the defendants had 
any proprietory or possessory interest in the premises 
at 368 South Main Street, Park City, Utah, which was 
superior in point of time or in any other way to that 
of the plaintiff. Any interest of the defendants must 
have come about by virtue of the interest which the 
defendants Mathews had in the property. The 
defendants Mathews interest in the property came by 
virtue of the Uniform Real Estate Contract which they 
entered into with the former landlords, Robert Mc-
Conaughy, et al. [Ex. 4-D]. It is clear from this con-
tract the former landlords retained title to the prem-
ises until all of the payments were made. [Ex. 4-D, 
§19]. 
Certainly any sale of the premises would have 
to be made subject to any valid leasehold interest 
which a tenant had in the premises. Both Fitzpatrick 
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and Lence knew the plaintiff owned the equipment 
on the premises at the time the locks were changed 
and each of them knew he was the party responsible 
on the lease. They both assumed the telephone calls 
to vacate the premises or the visits to the premises 
were all that was necessary. They did not observe 
the statutory requirements of notice, lawsuit, etc. 
6. Why the defendants' conduct constituted a 
wrongful eviction of the plaintiff. In this action the 
plaintiff is claiming he was wrongfully evicted from 
the premises he was occupying at 368 South Main 
Street, Park City, Utah; and that as a sole, direct 
and proximate cause of said wrongful eviction he 
has sustained certain damages. A wrongful eviction 
of a tenant by his landlord may be either an actual 
or constructive eviction. Any disturbance of the 
tenant's possession by the landlord, or someone acting 
under his authority which renders the premises unfit 
for occupancy for the purposes for which they were 
demised or which deprives the tenant of the beneficial 
enjoyment of the premises causing him to abandon 
them, amounts to constructive eviction. In this re-
gard, the intention on the part of the landlord to 
wrongfully evict the tenant may be indicated by the 
acts of the landlord and may be presumed by the 
character of the act if the neccessary result of it is 
to deprive the tenant of the beneficial enjoyment of 
the premises. The landlord's interference with the 
tenant's right of ingress and egress, as by locking the 
door of a building, is sufficient to constitute a con-
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structive eviction. 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and 
Tenant, Part X, EVICTION; 314 et sequel, Section 301 
"Actual or Constructive Eviction," p. 317 Section 302 
"Elements and Requisites—Generally; Intention of 
Landlord/' p. 323 Section 307 "Interference with In-
gress and Egress." 
In the instant case, the intention of the defend-
ants to wrongfully evict both the plaintiff and Mar-
vin Ryan is indicated by the action of William Lence 
in ordering Marvin Ryan to close the BLACKOUT 
business or Lence would take action against him; by 
the telephone calls from Peggy Fitzpatrick to Ross 
Wangsgard saying the building had been sold, the 
new owners would not talk to Wangsgard; that a 
contractor was coming to remodel the premises for 
a new tenant and that Wangsgard had no choice but 
to remove his equipment and get out. It was also 
indicated by changing the locks on the building and 
by refusing to allow the plaintiff to remove the back 
bar and front bar which belonged to him. 
A lease of real property from a landlord to a 
tenant caries with the lease an implied covenant the 
tenant or lessee shall have the quiet and peaceable 
possession and enjoyment of the leased premises, so 
far as regards the lessor or anyone lawfully claiming 
through or under him or anyone asserting title to 
the premises superior and paramount to the lessor. 
This means the landlord is bound not to do anything 
calculated to interfere writh the free and full enjoy-
ment and possession and use of the premises by the 
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tenant or lessee. Where there is an interference with, 
or interruption of, the peaceable and quiet enjoyment 
and possession and use of the premises through 
some act or failure to act of the the lessor or landlord, 
an action may be maintained based upon the breach 
of this implied covenant of quiet enjoyment. Any 
direct, substantial interference by the landlord, or 
by persons acting under his authority, with the actual 
possession of the tenant constitutes a breach of this 
covenant of quiet enjoyment. 41 A.L.R. 2d 1414, 
"Breach of Covenant for Quiet Enjoyment of Lease," 
Section 3, p. 1420, "Implied Covenant In General." 
Sandall v. Hoskins, 104 U. 50, 137 P. 2d 819 (1943). 
In this case, the defendants contend they are not 
liable to the plaintiff for wrongful eviction because 
the plaintiff was not in lawful possession of the prem-
ises; but had in fact and effect subleased the premises 
to Marvin Ryan. This argument overlooks both the 
fact that actual possession is not required in the case 
of wrongful eviction and the fact that damage to a 
subtenant is actionable damage to the tenant. The 
right of the lessee or tenant to use and occupy the 
demised premises is not, in the absence of restrictions 
in the lease, limited to a personal occupation. In the 
absence of any such restrictions, the tenant may oc-
cupy and use the premises through his agents and 
servants, or he may sublet or assign the leased prem-
ises so as to confer upon his sublessee or assignee his 
right to use or occupancy. 49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord 
and Tenant, p. 248 Section 229 "Duty of Lessee to 
Occupy Premises." 
33 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The tenant is under no obligation, in the absence 
of specific provisions therefore, to occupy or use or 
to continue to use the leased premises; even though 
one of the parties or both expected and intended that 
they should be used for the particular purpose to 
which they seem to be adapted or for which they 
seem to be constructed. In other words, making entry 
upon or taking possession of a demised premises, is 
not a general obligation of a lessee. The lessee's 
mere removal from the demised premises does not 
entitle the landlord in the absence of some provision 
in the lease giving him the right to do so, to enter 
onto the premises and terminate the lease, 49 Am. 
Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant, p. 248 Section 229 
"Duty of Lessee to Occupy Premises." 
The defendant's contention that Ross Wangsgard 
was not in actual possession of the leased premises 
misinterprets the scope and degree of the possession 
required for wrongful eviction as opposed to forcible 
entry. Actual possession is not an element of wrong-
ful eviction although it may be an element of "forc-
ible entry." However, even assuming actual pos-
session is a necessary requirement of "forcible entry" 
the plaintiff, Ross Wangsgard, contends he did have 
sufficient actual possesion of the leased premises prior 
to the unlawful acts of the defendants as stated in 
part 3 supra, "What was the plaintiff Ross Wangs-
gardes interest in the premises at 368 South Main 
Street, Park City, Utah, at the time of defendants' 
wrongful conduct?" 
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Under these facts and circumstances, the plain-
tiff, Ross Wangsgard, was in fact in lawful actual use 
and occupancy of the premises at 368 South Main 
Street, Park City, Utah, for more than five days prior 
to the time the locks were changed, and for more 
than five days prior to the time the defendant Lence 
entered the premises and ordered Ryan out threaten-
ing legal action if Ryan did not leave. Hargrave v. 
Leigh, 73 U. 178, 273 P. 298 (1928); Paxton v. Fisher, 
86 U. 408, 45 P. 2d 903, (1935); Buchanan v. Crites, 
106 U. 428, 150 P. 2d 100 (1944); Larsen v. Knight, 
120 U. 261, 233 P. 2d 365 (1951); Lambert v. Sine, 
123 U. 145, 256 P. 2d 241 (1953); King v. Firm, 3 U. 
2d419, 285 P. 2d 1114 (1955);Peterson v. Piatt, 16 U. 
2d 220, 400 P. 2d 507 (1965); Freeway Park Building 
Inc. v. Western States Wholesale Supply, 22 U.2d 266, 
451 P. 2d 778 (1969); Monter v. Kratzers Specialty 
Bread Company, 29 U. 2d 18, 504 P. 2d 40 (1972); 
Perkins v. Spencer, 121 U. 468, 243 P. 2d 446 (1952); 
6 A.L.R. 3d 177 "Right of Landlord Legally Entitled 
to Possession to Dispossess Tenant Without Legal 
Process." 
Finally the defendants argue they are not liable 
to plaintiff because any damage was to the sublessee 
Marvin Ryan and not to the plaintiff. Even assuming 
the plaintiff was not conducting any business on the 
leased premises and did not have his recreational 
items there, the overwhelming weight of authority 
is to the effect the landlord is responsible to the tenant 
for a wrongful interference by the landlord with the 
tenant's sublessee. The interference may be such as 
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to be a breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment or 
an eviction as where the landlord might expel the 
sublessee. 49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant, 
483 Section 502 "Liability of the Lessor to the Lessee 
for Interference;" 70 A.L.R. 1477, "Liability of Land-
lord for Interferring with Tenants of Lessee."; 
Levitzky v. Canning, 33 Calif. 299 (1867); Central 
Business College v. Rutherford, 47 Colo. 277, 107 P. 
279 (1910); Aste v. Putman's Hotel Co., 247 Mass. 
147, 141 NE 666, 31 A.L.R. 149 (1923); New York v. 
Mabie, 13 NY 151, 64 Am. Dec. 538 (1855). 
When the landlords Mathews and/or their 
agents Lence and/or Fitzpatrick interf erred with the 
sublessee, Marvin Ryan, to such an extent to consti-
tute a breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment to 
which the said Marvin Ryan was entitled so as 
to constitute a wrongful eviction or a forcible entry 
upon the premises occupied by the said Marvin Ryan, 
then the landlord and/or their agents would be liable 
in civil damages to the tenant Ross Wangsgard for 
such interference. 
From the Statement of Facts, it is clear the de-
fendants wrongfully evicted Ross Wangsgard and 
also his subtenant Marvin Ryan at the time of their 
wrongful conduct by threatening Ryan with action 
if he did not leave the premises; and by changing 
the locks on the doors. 
7. Why the defendants' conduct constituted a 
forcible entry against the plaintiff. The statutes of 
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the State of Utah dealing with forcible entry and 
detainer provide as follows: 
"78-36-1. 'Forcible Entrf Defined. Every per-
son is guilty of a forcible entry, who either: 
(1) by breaking open -doors, windows or 
other parts of a house, or by fraud, intimida-
tion or stealth or by any kind of violence or 
circumstances of terror, enters upon or into 
any real property; or, 
(2) after entering peaceably upon real 
property, turns out by force, threats or 
menacing conduct the party in actual pos-
session." 
In this action, the plaintiff alleges the defend-
ants were guilty of a violation of subsection (1) of 
the state statutes when William Lence entered onto 
the BLACKOUT premises and then ordered Marvin 
Ryan out threatening further legal action if Ryan 
did not leave by Sunday night. The plaintiff further 
alleges a forcible entry occurred when the defendants 
changed the locks on the doors on the premises at 
368 South Main Street, Park City, Utah, and refused 
to allow either the plaintiff and/or Marvin Ryan to 
continue operating the business on the said premises 
after the date the locks were changed. 
The plaintiff alleges he satisfied the actual pos-
session requirements of the subsection by virtue of 
his leasehold, proprietory, and possessory interest as 
set forth in part 3 of this argument entitled "What 
was the plaintiff Ross Wangsgard's interest in the 
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premises at 368 South Main Street, Park City, Utah, 
at the time of defendants9 wrongful conduct? 
The plaintiff further submits the word "pos-
session" as used in section 78-36-1(2), U.C.A. - 1953, 
is broad enough to include possession by a subtenant 
as well as by the plaintiff personally. This position 
is taken because of the provisions of section 78-36-3 
dealing with unlawful detainer. The latter statute 
uses the word possession to mean either "in person 
or by subtenant." The plaintiff submits the legis-
lature did not intend to attach any different meaning 
to the word possession in subsection 78-36-1 (2) ; since 
both the forcible entry statute and the unlawful 
detainer statutes were enacted at the same time. 
The forcible entry statute says "every person" 
who does certain things is guilty of forcible entry. 
There is no exception for one who may by contract 
or lease be authorized to enter or for an owner or 
landlord who as a matter of law may have right to 
possession. Everyone is guilty of a forcible entry who 
commits the acts specified. All that an occupant 
needs to show in order to be protected by the pro-
visions of this statute, is that he was in peaceful 
possession of the land or premises prior to the "forc-
ible entry" by the other party. If the landlord takes 
the law into his own hand and turns a tenant in 
peaceful possession out by means of force, fraud, 
intimidation, stealth or by any kind of violence, he 
makes himself liable to that tenant for damages. 
Freeway Park Building, Inc. v. Western States Whole-
38 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
sale Supply, 22 U. 2d 266, 451 P. 2d 778 (1969); 
Paxton v. Fisher, 86 U. 408, 415, 45 P. 2d 903 (1935). 
The landlord has no right without the tenant's 
consent to enter upon the tenant's use and occupancy 
of the premises, to use a key to gain entrance to the 
premises without the tenant's permission and/or to 
change the locks on the doors to the premises without 
the tenant's permission. It is clear that even rightful 
owners cannot without being civilly liable for their 
actions take the law into their own hands by violence 
or by entry in the night time or during the absence 
of the occupants of any real property. Freeway Park 
Building, Inc. v. Western States Wholesale Supply, 
22 U.2d 266, 451 P. 2d 778 (1969); Paxton v. Fisher, 
86 U. 408, 415, 45 P. 2d 903 (1935). It appears clear 
the defendant entered onto the premises and changed 
the locks between April 16-26, when Wangsgard was 
temporarily absent and at a time when Lence and 
Fitzpatrick both knew the property belonged to 
Wangsgard; that he was the tenant in the lease agree-
ments and they had not served him or Ryan with 
any notice to quit or vacate the premises or com-
menced any legal action to accomplish same; and at 
a time when they knew Wangsgard was claiming his 
leasehold rights to continue in business. 
Insofar as the forcible entry statutes are con-
cerned, "peaceful possession" may exist without 
occupancy as where a man's servant is in actual 
possession of the property and is holding possession 
for him. A partes possession continues notwith-
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standing the presence of other persons or their pro-
perty on the land provided they hold in subordina-
tion to the tenants rights and not as independent 
claimants or possessors. 
In this case, the possession of the plaintiff Ross 
Wangsgard continued on the premises at 368 South 
Main Street, Park City, Utah ,even though Marvin 
Ryan was also on or in the property. This would be 
so because Marvin Ryan's claim to the use and occu-
pancy of the premises was subordinate to Ross Wangs-
gard's right and was dependent upon whatever rights 
Ross Wangsgard had. Marvin Ryan did not have any 
independent claim or possessory right with the land-
lord separate and apart from the right which Ross 
Wangsgard held. The landlords testified they had 
no oral or written agreement with Ryan to lease the 
BLACKOUT premises and Ryan told defendant Lence 
he was renting the premises from Wangsgard. 
To constitute peaceful possession as contem-
plated by the forcible entry statutes, it is not neces-
sary the party be personally present on the premises 
at the time of the offense; if he is in actual exercise 
of authority and control over them. Generally speak-
ing, the actual possession which is sufficient consists 
in exercising acts of dominion over the land in 
dispute and making the ordinary use of it and may 
consist in, and may be shown by, a great number and 
combination of acts, the character of which may 
necessarily vary with the situation of the parties, 
the character of the land, and the purpose to which 
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it is adapted. 35 Am. Jur. 2d, Forcible Entry and 
Detainer^ 901 Section 15 "Character and Sufficiency 
of Possession" and Section 16 "Exclusiveness of 
Possession/' 36A CJ.S. Forcible Entry and Detainer 
1084 Section 111 "Nature and Elements of 
Offense, and p. 970 Section 10 "Character of Pos-
session in General." 
The law in Utah is clear if the defendants or 
either of them did enter upon the premises at 368 
South Main Street, Park Citj^ Utah and order the 
plaintiff and Ryan out with threats of action or if 
they changed the locks on the doors to the premises 
without the consent of Ross Wangsgard and without 
complying with the state statutes as to the giving 
of proper notice and obtaining a valid court order 
allowing the defendants to take possession, these acts 
would be sufficient to find the defendants had vio-
lated the provisions of the forcible entry statutes of 
the State of Utah. In this connection, the changing 
of the locks on the door without the tenant's per-
mission would be sufficient force and/or sufficient 
conduct as contemplated by the statute. Buchanan v. 
Crites, 106 U. 428, 150 P. 2d 100 (1944). 
The defendants raise as a defense the fact the 
plaintiff was permitted to remove his equipment 
from the premises after the locks were changed and 
therefore was not damaged. The fact that Ross 
Wangsgard may have removed his property from the 
premises after the locks were changed is not material 
and would not constitute a defense to the charge of 
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either "wrongful eviction" and/or "forcible entry." 
35 Am. Jur. 2, Forcible Entry and Detainer, 920 
Section 42 "Defenses." 
Furthermore, the damages the plaintiff alleges 
he sustained are not merely the loss of the sale of 
the business to Marvin Ryan but also the loss of 
$200 net monthly profit from his own recreational 
items and the mental anguish he experienced which 
clearly are elements of damage in either wrongful 
eviction or forcible entry. 49 Am. Jur. 2d, Land-
lord and Tenant, 339 Section 323 "Damages for 
Wrongful Eviction, Measure and Elements General-
ly"; p. 341 Section 326 "Injuries to Business; Lost 
Profits"; p. 342 Section 327 "Physical Injury and 
Mental Anguish"; 17 A.L.R. 2d 936 "Recovery by 
Tenants of Damage for Physical Injuries or Mental 
Anguish Occasioned by Wrongful Eviction"; Har-
grave v. Leigh, 73 U. 178, 273 P. 298 (1928); Lam-
bert v. Sine, 123 U. 137, 256 P. 2d 241 (1953); Peter-
son v. Piatt, 16 U. 330, 400 P.2d 507 (1965); Perkins 
v. Spencer, 121 U. 468, 243 P. 2d 446 (1952); Free-
way Park Building, Inc. v. Western States Wholesale 
Supply, 22 U. 2d 266, 451 P. 2d 778 (1969). 
It is clear in the State of Utah, a landlord who 
is entitled to possession of certain premises must, on 
refusal of the tenant to surrender the premises, resort 
to the remedies given by law to secure it. If the land-
lord, contrary to the terms of the Utah Statutes enters 
by force without resort to legal process, he is by 
statute made civilly liable to the disposed tenant. 
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In this case, even if the tenant, Ross Wangsgard, 
and/or Marvin Ryan, were behind in the payment 
of their rent and even though the lease had expired 
and even though the lease contains a provision per-
mitting the landlord to re-enter the leased premises 
and take possession of same upon default of the 
tenant and even though the lease may have been 
breached in other ways such as subletting, etc., the 
landlord has no right to deprive the tenant of the 
possession of his premises without taking the legal 
steps that are required by law. 
These legal steps include, among other things, 
a proper notice to the tenant to vacate the premises 
and a court order ordering or permitting the landlord 
to retake physical possession of the property in ques-
tion. The tenant who is entitled to the protection of 
this process and these steps is the tenant who has the 
responsibility under the lease to the landlord which 
in this case would be Ross Wangsgard. Hargrove v. 
Leigh, 73 U. 178, 273 P. 298 (1928); Paxton v. Fisher, 
86 U. 408, 45 P. 2d 903 (1935); Buchanan v. Crites, 
106 U. 428, 150 P. 2d 100 (1944); Larsen v. Knight, 
120 U. 261, 233 P. 2d 365 (1951); Lambert v. Sine, 
123 U. 145, 256 P. 2d 241 (1953); King v. Firm, 3 U. 
2d 419, 285 P. 2d 1114 (1955); Peterson v. Piatt, 16 
U. 2d 330, 400 P. 2d 507 (1965); Freeway Park Build-
ing Inc. v. Western States Wholesale Supply, 22 U. 
2d 266, 451 P. 2d 778 (1969); Monter v. Kratzers 
Specialty Bread Company, 29 U. 2d 18, 504 P. 2d 40 
(1972); Perkins v. Spencer, 121 U. 468, 243 P. 2d 
446 (1952); 6 A.L.R.3d 177 "Right of Landlord 
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Legally Entitled to Possession to Dispossess Tenant 
Without Legal Process." 
Neither Ross Wangsgard nor Marvin Ryan gave 
their consent and permission to the defendants or 
any of them to change the locks on the premises at 
368 South Main Street, Park City, Utah, and/or to 
re-enter and take possession of the said premises at 
that address. 
Insofar as the proper notice which a landlord 
must give to the tenant to vacate the property is 
concerned, Section 78-36-3(2) Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended, provides when a tenant has leased 
real property for an indefinite time with monthly 
rent reserved, he is entitled to a notice requiring him 
to quit the premises at the expiration of such month 
and this notice must be served upon him fifteen days 
or more prior to the end of the month. 
And even though the REAL PROPERTY LEASE 
[Ex. 5-P] terminated on October 31, 1972, para-
graph 17 in the said lease continues the tenancy on 
a month-to-month basis. This paragraph provides 
as follows: 
"17. HOLDOVER: In the event tenants shall 
remain in possession of the leased premises 
or any part thereof after the expiration of 
the term of this lease without any written 
agreement, such holding over shall constitute 
a tenancy for month to month at a monthly 
rental equivalent to the then reasonable 
rental value of the leased premises but not less 
than $175.00 per month." 
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This provision of the lease means when the tenant 
Ross Wangsgard remained in possesion of the leased 
premises after October 31, 1972, without any written 
agreement therefore, he became a tenant from 
month to month and he would be entitled to the 
protection of the provisions of Section 78-36-3(2) 
cited above. 
None of the defendants in this action, complied 
with Section 78-36-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
dealing with notice and each of them are therefore 
guilty of both a "wrongful eviction" of the tenant 
Ross Wangsgard and were guilty of a "forcible entry" 
upon the premises being occupied by the said Ross 
Wangsgard as those terms "wrongful eviction" 
and/or "forcible entry" are discussed hereinabove 
in the brief. Perkins v. Spencer, 121 U. 468, 243 P. 
2d 446 (1952); 50 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant, 
93-94 Section 1206 "Notice to Quit - Form, Cer-
tainty, and Sufficiency; Notice in the Alternative to 
Pay Back Rent or to Quit." 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the appellant 
respectfully submits this Honorable Supreme Court 
should do the following: (1) reverse the decision of 
the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow in granting the 
respondents' motion for summary judgment, (2) find 
and so order that all respondents were guilty of both 
a forcible entry and wrongful eviction of the appel-
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lant Ross Wangsgard, (3) remand this case for a 
new trial on the issues of damages only, and (4) in 
the event this court remands the entire case for a 
new trial on all issues then the appellant also requests 
a ruling from this court as to the admissibility of 
certain real property leasehold agreements Exs. 5-P, 
6-P, and 7-P and as to the testimony from the land-
lord. 
Respectfully submitted 
McINTOSH & ROBERTSON 
I / JAMES A. MCINTOSH 
<y A ttorneys for A ppellant 
525 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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